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1. Introduction 
Firms, as social and economic actors, are members of numerous 
networks, which can be formal or informal, structured or de-structured, 
managed or not managed. The economic and managerial literature 
substantially agrees on the presence of a positive economic return from those 
interactions, arguing that isolated firms show systematically a worse 
performance with respect to firms interacting with different subjects. 
Networking activities of firms have been deeply investigated in the 
entrepreneurial and managerial fields, with a long standing theoretical and 
empirical research that remains particularly active also in recent years. The 
numerous quantitative analyses and surveys on the effect of networking have 
been accompanied by a parallel qualitative research aimed at explaining the 
contents of relationships trying to complement existing studies (Jack, 2010). 
One of the most problematic aspects that emerges by analyzing the literature 
relies in the absence of a coherent and observable definition of alliances or 
networking activities. It is very rare to find works adopting the same angle 
of analysis so that the obtained results are difficult to compare, as highlighted 
by Olivers and Ebers (1998). While scholars unanimously recognize that 
networks are important, they cannot clearly define a general definition of 
network for condensing information on the nature, intensity and functioning 
of network activities.  
Li et al., (2015) identify important social networks among entrepreneurs 
in the extensive inter-firms linkages within industrial clusters as instrument 
for supporting co-opetions, innovation and sharing information flows. Other 
authors like Birley, (1985), Chell and Baines, (2000) or Robson and Bennet 
(2000) identify other kind of entrepreneurial social networks including 
among them chamber of commerce, contracts with governments or 
                                                          
1 University of Turin. 
2 University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto. 
3 University of Turin and IRCrES-CNR. 
4 University of Turin, Collegio Carlo Alberto and IRCrES-CNR. 
V - 66 
specialized agencies and trade organization as informal networks able to 
promote information sharing. On the contrary, Parker (2008) defines formal 
business networks as organizations that bring together entrepreneurs for 
sharing information and experiences. Another, more restrictive definition by 
Huggins (2001) define formal networks as “initiatives to bring together firms 
to co-produce, co-market, co-purchase or co-operate in product or market 
development trough contractual agreements”.  
Our paper, based on an empirical investigation on a very large sample of 
Italian small and medium enterprises (SMEs), propose an extensive 
investigation on the effects of formal network agreements on different 
measures of firms’ performance. Thanks to the formal nature of the 
agreements considered, detailed information on the characteristics of the 
network can be collected on large scale, opening important opportunity for 
analysis. After merging information on alliances with economic and 
financial data, we propose to investigate the effects of networks on different 
measure of competitiveness and performances in the short and medium term, 
with the idea that also in the short run networking can create benefits. The 
results of a fixed-effect panel estimation, which tries to solve the potential 
problems coming from self-selection of best firms, show that, even in the 
short run, network agreements increase the value added created per unit of 
sales, as well as the export propensity of participating firms, while the 
immediate effects on profits are mixed. Many differences emerge in terms of 
the prevailing effect according to firm’s size, geographical location and 
sector of activity, creating new interesting directions for research. The 
applied methodology is similar to that applied by Schoonjans et al. (2013) 
for estimating the effect of the government networking program for East-
Flanders SMEs (Plato program), but has been applied for identifying the 
effect from networks on competitiveness and profitability instead of growth 
trends.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the most relevant literature on networking and economic 
performance. Section 3 presents the Italian case, section 4 reports the 
methodology, data are described in Sections 5, while Section 6 presents our 
main results, while the final section concludes and discusses some interesting 
implications. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Networks and members’ performances 
The long standing idea that belonging to a network is beneficial for firms 
has been the main focus of a boundless bulk of literature in the managerial, 
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entrepreneurial and economic field. There are several channels through 
which networking can sustain performance. Networking reduces transaction 
costs (Lin and Lin, 2016), can supply firms with resources in a flexible 
manner at a reduced cost (Li et al., 2015), can facilitate knowledge flows and 
technological improvements (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009), as well as 
stimulate innovation and new product development (Mazzola et al., 2016). 
However, despite a strong convergence on the positive effects of networks 
on performances in the theoretical literature, the empirical results remain still 
weak, even if a general consensus on the existence of some general positive 
benefits has been substantially reached, mainly for SMEs (Schoonjas et al. 
2013).  
Havnes and Senneseth (2001), analyzing a sample of more than 1700 
firms operating in eight different European countries, find no benefits from 
networking in the short run in terms of employment or sales growth. 
However, in the long term firms involved in alliances and networks show an 
increasing geographical extension of their market. Watson (2007) proposes 
one of the larger cross-sectional studies available in the literature, using data 
on Australian SMEs with less than 200 employees. Formal networks are 
defined as those related to external accountants and industrial associations. 
He finds through a Logit analysis that firms involved in such weak formal 
networks show a higher survival probability and a higher economic 
performance, in terms of the probability of being over the 25th percentile of 
ROA and sales growth5.  
Mixed results are reported by Koka and Prescott (2008) who analyze 
firms’ alliances (medium and large firms) in the steel industry in 40 different 
countries, using sales per employees as a performance measure. By applying 
a random-effect panel estimation, they find that firms benefit from alliances 
in relatively stable environments. However, in case of radical changes, 
networks are negative related with performance. Positive effects on profits 
(measured by a scale variable condensing market performances) are found 
by Ritala (2012), even if the focus is limited to study the collaboration among 
competing firms in Sweden. 
On the Italian context, Bentivogli et al. (2013) propose an extensive 
analysis of the determinants of networking, using a sample of 1.000 firms 
involved in network agreements. They estimate through a probit model the 
probability of entering such contracts, and find that firms located in Southern 
or North-Eastern regions of the country, firms characterized by larger size 
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and by larger revenue growth show a higher probability of entering network 
agreements. More recently, Confindustria (2016), by applying a propensity 
score matching to identify a sample of similar firms not involved in network 
activities, argued that most productive firms are those entering network 
agreements as well as firms more oriented to foreign markets. Finally, 
Colombo et al. (2014), after substantially confirming the above findings for 
Italian firms, proposes the first investigation on the effect of the Italian 
network agreement on performances. Using a sample of 6.000 networked 
firms and 70.000 non-networked firms, they show that the probability of 
having an EBIT improvement is positively (even if marginally not 
significant) related to networking, while sales growth seems not being 
significantly related to networks.  
The most recent economic literature starts highlighting potential 
endogeneity problems regarding the relationship between signing network 
contracts and unobservable firms’ characteristics, aspects which were 
substantially ignored in previous studies trying to estimate the economic 
outcomes of networking. Bodnaruk et al. (2013) argue that the probability of 
engaging business alliances, and then to participate to network agreements, 
is strongly influenced by the quality of governance. The latter strictly 
depends on the quality and ability of managers (or of owners in case of small 
firms without managers), so that the identification of the causal effect 
crucially depends on the possibility to separate these unobservable factors, 
as well as other observable factors, from the presence of network alliances. 
In the methodological section, we will take those issues in due account  
Our first hypothesis is therefore related to the link between network 
participation and performance. 
H1: entering a formal networks stimulates cooperation, coordination 
along the supply chain and resources sharing and it is expected to increase 
value added creation and profitability, also in the short run. 
Having access to additional resources at lower cost and to additional 
information are the main aspects linking networks and international 
activities. Network partners can help SMEs characterized by low export 
propensity to accumulate experience and information, which can be used 
increase sales in foreign markets. This can be favored also by sharing 
resources, transaction costs and risks relative to making business abroad (Lu 
and Beamish, 2001). Consequently, the participation to alliances and 
networks can increase the probability of selling abroad as well as the 
intensity of the internationalization process. Recent contributions, reviewed 
by Fernhaber and Li (2013), are mainly focused on the participation to 
international network agreements, rather than to networking in general. Yu 
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et al. (2011) is one of the rare cases of recent empirical works highlighting 
how networking can enhance international sales by stimulating entrepreneurs 
or managers to recognize international opportunities. In particular, they show 
that the probability of making business abroad is positively related to 
technology and marketing alliances.  
H2: networking activities allow firms to have low cost access to important 
resources and sources of information, and are expected to increase member 
firms’ export shares.  
The context in which firms operate, as well as their intrinsic 
characteristics can deeply influence the potential outcome in term of 
economic performance. This aspect has been implicitly argued in different 
works, but rigorous empirical tests are uncommon. According to Huggins 
(2000), the socio economic environment in which the firm operates deeply 
influences the potential benefits of networking activities, affecting the firms’ 
ability to take advantage from (Szarka, 1990). In Italy, the socio-economic 
environment is very different across regions. If, on the one hand, the lack of 
resources or infrastructures of a region can affect the decision of entering 
networks for firms located in that area, on the other hand, the potential 
benefits from being a network member could be stronger in underdeveloped 
areas. Similar motivations on the general environment in which firms operate 
are also related to potential differences among industries or groups of 
industries. Finally, even if networking is a phenomenon of interest mainly 
for SMEs, a more precise investigation of the network effect for different 
firm size classes are indirectly reported by different authors (Watson, 2007). 
H3: different firms enter networks for different objectives with different 
results in term of economic outcomes. Small firms enter network for 
reducing cost and increasing performance. Medium firms already 
characterized by an average higher efficiency thanks to their size, enter 
networks mainly for opening new market opportunities abroad. 
 
3. The Italian network contract 
In an attempt to stimulate technological innovations and improve the 
competitiveness of SMEs, Italy adopted in 2009 a regulation for “Enterprises 
network”. Article 3 paragraph 4-ter and following of Decree 5/2009 
(converted into Law 33 of 2009)6 defines the “network contract” as a contract 
allowing two or more enterprises to pursue the goal of individually and 
                                                          
6 The law of April 9, 2009, n. 33, enacting, with amendments, the Law Decree 10 February 
2009, n. 5 concerning urgent measures to support industrial sectors in crisis. The law was 
amended by Art. 42 of Decree 78/2010 translated into Law 122/2010 and subsequent 
amendments. 
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collectively increase their innovative capacity and market competitiveness. 
On the basis of a shared framework program, enterprises mutually undertake 
to collaborate, to exchange industrial, commercial, technical or technological 
information or services, or to jointly perform one or more activities. As such, 
the network agreement features a model of legal cooperation inspired by the 
logic of auto-regulation between contracting parties: the regulation does not 
prescribe any particular right or obligation for members, who are free to 
choose the details and specifications of the agreement. 
The flexible normative background is intentionally weak in terms of 
binding constraints, in order to support any kind of collaboration: it allows 
companies to specify in detail “the common program and cooperation 
procedures between joining enterprises”. The fact that the legislator does not 
state prescriptive rules promotes the creation of heterogeneous kinds of 
network, from horizontal models, where members are similar SMEs, to the 
more popular vertical model, in which a leading company strengthens the 
link with its suppliers’ chain. 
The basic requirements of the network contract include the statement of 
the strategic goal and common scopes in order to reach improvements in 
terms of innovative capacity and competitiveness, the identification of a 
network program that contains the activities and investments needed for the 
implementation of the strategic goal, as well as the specification of rights and 
duties assumed for each participant. The establishment of a common budget 
is not mandatory, as well as the definition of a common representative body. 
The firms can also establish entry and exit rules, and ending conditions for 
the network. 
 
4. Methodology 
To investigate the impact of firm networking activities on performances, 
we consider the following regression model, applied at a large scale on a 
very large and representative sample of Italian SMEs, for which we have 
complete financial statement data. 
 
??? ? ? ? ???? ? ???? ? ??? ? ??? ? ???  (1) 
 
??? represents the selected measure of performance (value added created, 
profits of export propensity), ??? is a dummy variable identifying the 
networking status that changes over time, and becomes active when the firm 
enters a network agreement. ??? is a vector of firm-level time-variant 
controls, including standard indicators able to explain performance such as 
firm age, firm sixe, the degree of mechanization, an index of vertical 
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disintegration. ?? is a vector of dummies indicating a specific year of 
analysis. The last part of the equation, ??? ? ???, indicates the error term: the 
first component ??? is correlated with the presence of network alliances, 
while the second component ??? is not correlated with networking activities. 
In order to identify the causal effect of networking on performance, it is 
crucial to identify observable and unobservable factors influencing the 
choice of enter a network. As observable controls, we include some 
indicators reflecting differences among firms in relation to 
financial/economic aspects (i.e. mechanization, vertical integration, age, 
size). Moreover, we include dummies able to capture structural differences 
in performance, due to regional, time and industry specificities. 
It is more difficult to deal with unobservable factors, which enter the error 
term ???, creating potential endogeneity problems. Such aspects can be seen 
as specific features such as the firm tradition and culture, or firm “quality” 
that substantially coincides with the ability or quality of the main decision 
maker within the firm. Since such unobservable factors undoubtedly 
influence the probability of being involved in network agreements, ignoring 
them can lead to an over-estimate of the real causal effect of networking on 
performance. If we are willing to assume that the firm culture or the 
ability/quality/capacity of the managers7 are stable over time, any potential 
endogeneity problem can be solved through the fixed effect estimator, based 
on the within group transformation of equation (1).  
 
5. Data 
Our main source of information is the Infocamere database on Italian 
network agreements that collects data on all the network contracts signed 
since the introduction of the network contract until the 31/12/2015. The total 
number of firms involved in such kind of contracts is 11,927, while the total 
number of networks is 2,282. For each contract, we are able to identify each 
member and classify it as self-employer, micro-firm, SME or large firm. We 
have information on the network name, number and name of partners, main 
objects, month and year of the network creation.  
In order to evaluate the effect of the network agreement on performance, 
we need to recover economic information for each firm. We decided to focus 
on Italian SMEs, as anticipated in the introduction, in order to reduce 
heterogeneity and because of the relevance of networking for them. We 
considered the whole population of Italian firms that are compelled to 
                                                          
7 Notice that, since our sample is largely based on SMEs, in many case managers are not 
specifically part of the workforce, but coincide with the owners. 
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register the balance sheet, i.e. limited companies and corporations, and we 
selected only firms with a number of employees between 10 and 250. In Italy, 
only for those firms it is possible to obtain reliable economic and financial 
data. Using the tax code as a firm identifier, we matched the INFOCAMERE 
data with the AIDA dataset (provided by Bureau Van Dijk, which contains 
the balance sheets of all Italian firms. Notice that, for each firm in the AIDA 
database that enters a network agreement we have information on the whole 
network, even if for some members we do not have financial data. Finally, 
we completed the economic information by merging data on international 
sales included in the ISTAT-COEWEB dataset at individual level, using 
again the tax code as a firm identifier.  
We were able to collect financial statement information for the period 
2008-2014 for a sample of 167,623 firms. We structured our database as an 
unbalanced panel, using all available information on Italian SMEs, including 
firms that were not active along all the period considered.  
Table 1 shows some statistics on the adoption of network agreements for 
the whole population of SMEs which are included in the AIDA database. As 
it is clear from the figures, the most consistent participation to the network 
agreement is very recent. There has been has a jump in 2012, and this 
represents one of the main limits of our analysis. The effects we try to 
estimates are essentially short run effects, but we have to introduce a certain 
lag on economic performance. 
 
Table1: Number of SMEs participating to the Italian network agreement 
Year N. of firms 
2010 33 
2011 327 
2012 1,051 
2013 2,080 
2014 2,792 
Total 6,283 
 
Even if the network agreement is immediately effective, it is reasonable 
to assume that its economical effects take some time to emerge: it is very 
difficult that a formal network officially born during the year can materialize 
its effect before the end of the year. Therefore, we consider the year of the 
contract as a sort of “transition period”, where the network has been formed, 
but its effects cannot influence the balance sheets, irrespective of the month 
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in which the contract has been signed. The financial variables relative to such 
year have been classified as “pre-network” observations, but the results are 
substantially stable if we treat such observations as missing values.  
The complete information on the network characteristics are not ignored, 
even if only corporations and limited companies can be used for evaluating 
the effects of networking on performance. In this vein, we create specific 
indicators considering all network members, including micro-firms, self-
employees, very small entrepreneurs and their specific characteristics. First 
of all, an index representing the geographical dispersion in terms of number 
of provinces has been computed as the ratio of the number of provinces over 
the total number of network members. Secondly, another indicator 
representing the network dispersion along the value chain has been computed 
using information on the activity code (ATECO2007) for each member. 
Similarly to the previous case, we use the ratio of the number of two-digit 
sectors characterizing network members over the number of network 
members.  
 
5.1 Variable used in the analysis 
Our empirical strategy is mainly based on estimating equation 1 for the 
whole sample and for different subsamples, following different models 
specification in order to test the robustness of the results. The main point of 
interest is the coefficient for the dummy variable “Network agreement” 
which takes the value of one the year after the firm enters a network. All the 
estimates keep into account the panel structure of the database and include 
firm fixed effects, controlling for self-selection and firm specific 
unobservable features, which are able to shift the probability of networking.  
We use four different measures of performance at the firm level. First of 
all we consider the value added created, computed as the ratio of value added 
over revenues, it indicates the capacity of generating value added per unit of 
revenues and it can be considered a measure of competitiveness. Secondly, 
we analyze the profitability level using two different indicators: ROA and 
ROS. ROA is defined as EBIT margin over Total Assets. ROA is one of the 
most commonly used measures of profitability, and it has been already 
adopted in the context of networking effect on performance by Goerzen and 
Beamish (2005) in the context of Multinationals. ROS is computed as EBIT 
margin over total sales, and it is another popular measure of profitability, 
indicating the profitability margin in respect to revenues. Finally, we focus 
on the capacity of entering foreign markets by analyzing the export 
propensity, defined by the ratio of foreign sales over total sales. The 
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internationalization capacity represents another important indicator of firm 
competitiveness. 
Following the managerial literature on the empirical studies on the 
determinants of performance, other firm time specific control variables have 
been included in the regression (see Nickell et al., 1997 for a review). Such 
variables enter gradually in the model specification in order to test the 
stability of obtained results. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables used in the analysis.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Description 
2010 2014 
mean sd mean sd 
VA/RT Value added / Sales ratio 0.33 0.19 0.35 0.19 
size Ln of total Sales 14.64 1.36 14.65 1.28 
age Years after foundation 17.45 18.66 21.30 17.51 
dis_vert External costs over Total costs 0.68 0.21 0.65 0.20 
K/RT Physical Assets over Sales 0.42 1.59 0.43 1.71 
ROS EBIT over sales 0.03 0.84 0.03 0.18 
ROA EBIT over total assets 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.62 
EXP/RT Export sales ratio 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.17 
Dummies           
Export Probability of exporting 24% 26% 
Networking 
Probability of entering 
networks --- 2% 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Empirical findings on the whole sample of Italian SMEs 
First of all, we address the first 3 hypotheses on the general effect of 
networking on performance. The effects can be considered as short term 
impacts, given the recent introduction of the specific network agreement in 
the Italian legislation. As already discussed, this represents one of the limits 
of the present research and leaves many questions open for future analysis.  
Columns 2/4 of table 4 (http://www.sidrea.it/network-agreements-
economic-performance-italian-smes/) report the estimates of three model 
specifications using the value added created per unit of sales as dependent 
variable. Firms involved in formal network agreements show a higher 
capacity of producing VA per unit of revenues, as suggested by the positive 
and significant coefficient estimated on the dummy Network agreement. 
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Therefore, a firm signs a network contract and decides to cooperate and to 
share resources with other firms, and after one year there is an increase of 
value added created per unit of revenues. The results is robust to different 
model specifications which always control for firm fixed effects, year 
specific effects, as well as different time-variant firm characteristics, among 
which vertical disintegration, degree of mechanization and export intensity. 
The effect of formal networks on value added created is limited in term of 
magnitude, but positive and always statistically significant. When a firm 
signs a network contracts, in the following years, its value added per unit of 
revenues increase of half percentage point in absolute term, with an increase 
near 2%. This increase remains significant also after controlling and isolating 
other firm specific characteristics which can influence value added created. 
If we focus on the other two performance measures, EBIT over Assets 
(ROA) and EBIT over Sales (ROS), the sign of estimated coefficients is 
negative, contrary to HP1, but the effect is significant only for ROS. This 
evidence suggests that the effect of networking on profits in the short term is 
negligible or negative, probably due to the initial cost of forming the network 
agreement. The results are substantially robust to different model 
specifications. Therefore, HP 1 seems to be supported by data only if the 
attention is focused on value added creation, while the positive effect of 
network agreements on profitability is not confirmed.  
The last two columns of table 4 (http://www.sidrea.it/network-
agreements-economic-performance-italian-smes/) report results of the 
estimates of networking effects on export propensity, measured as the ratio 
of exports over total sales. Firms involved in network agreements show a 
higher EXPORT propensity, and also in this case, the result is robust to 
different model specifications. The Italian network agreements seem to be 
valid instruments for sharing resources, experience and information with the 
goal of improving the firms’ presence in foreign markets. In fact, our 
estimates show that after entering network agreements, SMEs show a higher 
share of foreign sales, even when the general trend in increasing exports has 
been removed using year fixed effects. The effect of the network contract is 
estimated to be 0.006, a little bit more than a half percentage point. Given 
the average level of exports, near 25% of total sales in 2014, the networks 
increase the share by about 3%, a small but positive and significant effect. 
Therefore, our evidence substantially supports HP 2: SMEs share resources 
and information through networking also with the aim of increasing their 
presence in foreign markets. 
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6.2 Networking, different firms and different contexts  
If, intuitively smaller and larger firms should gain differently from 
networks, the direction of such differences cannot be easily predicted. We 
decide to split our sample of SMEs into two groups, identifying small (up to 
50 employees) and large SMEs (between 50-250 employees). The same 
empirical model (1) has been run separately for each subsample, as if the two 
categories of firms enter networks for different objectives. As shown in table 
5 (http://www.sidrea.it/network-agreements-economic-performance-italian-
smes/) the empirical evidence is supportive of a different impact for the two 
subgroups. First of all, the evidence on value added created per unit of sales 
seems to be driven by the subsample of small SMEs. The coefficient (0.0065) 
is larger than the one reported for the whole sample (0.0053), and the 
statistical significance is higher, too. For the subsample of large SMEs, 
instead, the sign is negative but not statistical significant, suggesting that the 
main effect of networking is not to be found in the value added created. On 
the contrary, the evidence on profitability, measured by ROA or ROS, does 
not highlight any interesting differences among the two subsamples, for 
which it is confirmed a substantial neutrality of profits, irrespective of firm 
size. 
However, considering the effects of networking on exports, it seems that 
the impact is much larger (0.017 as compared to 0.004) for firms employing 
more than 50 workers. This suggests that networking helps to increase 
exports, and the effect is stronger when firms are more structured, with an 
increase in export propensity near 20%. Therefore, HP2 is confirmed for 
both small and medium sized firms, and for the latter group effect is much 
larger, confirming HP3.  
Table 6 (http://www.sidrea.it/network-agreements-economic-
performance-italian-smes/) investigates in details the influence of the general 
socioeconomic environment in which firms operate, presenting separate 
regressions for different Italian in macro areas.8 In particular, we distinguish 
four macro areas: North-West, North-East, Centre and South Italy, the same 
used by the Italian national statistical institute (ISTAT) for data gathering. 
The South is commonly recognized to be the most underdeveloped area, with 
lacking infrastructure and services for firms, the Centre represents an 
intermediate situation, while the North-East and the North-West are both 
more developed, but regions characterize by a prevalence of smaller 
manufacturing firms and larger firms respectively.  
                                                          
8 The approach of grouping firms according to homogeneous socioeconomic subsystems is 
very common for empirical studies focusing on Italy. 
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The results show that in the North-West, network agreements never affect 
significantly the outcome we are interested in. Similarly, in the North-East, 
the network effect is limited to export propensity, that increases in line with 
the coefficient estimated for the whole sample of Italian SMEs. The situation 
is very different for firms located in the Centre and South Italy, for which, 
as expected, the positive outcome of networking is higher, both in terms of 
value added created and export propensity. After entering networks, value 
added per unit of revenues increases by 0.009 in magnitude (with respect to 
0.005 for whole sample), while export share increases by 0.08 (as compared 
to 0.005 for the whole sample) in both central and southern Italy 9. We can 
conclude that formal network agreements are more effective in less 
developed areas, where resource sharing represents a practical and cost-
saving way that partially compensates for the lack of infrastructure and 
services.  
The last angle of analysis is based on the innovative/operative 
environment characterizing each industrial activity, using homogeneous 
groups of sectors based on the Pavitt taxonomy.10 Table 7 
(http://www.sidrea.it/network-agreements-economic-performance-italian-
smes/) presents the results from estimating equation 1 for separate sectoral 
sub-samples. Using the two-digit Ateco classification, we are able to classify 
manufacturing activities and services according to the Pavitt taxonomy11. 
Accordingly, SMEs in our sample are divided into four groups of industries: 
Science Based, Specialized Suppliers, Scale and Information Intensity and 
Supplier Dominated. Also in this case, the intrinsic industry characteristics 
matter in influencing the outcomes of networking, even if firms’ fixed effects 
and years’ fixed effects are considered. In terms of the number of firms, 2/3 
of Italian SMEs operate in specialized suppliers or supplier dominate sectors. 
This is in line with expectations considering that Italian firms are more 
focused on traditional industries than other European developed countries 
(Germany, France and the UK, for example). The estimates reported in table 
7 (http://www.sidrea.it/network-agreements-economic-performance-italian-
smes/) highlights that firms operating in specialized suppliers industries 
                                                          
9 Unfortunately, the effect on profits, measured by ROA, does not clarify the picture. The 
estimates of the same model using ROS as dependent variable have not been reported (but are 
available upon request), but are substantially equivalent to those based on ROA.  
10 In the industrial economic literature (see Archibugi, 2001 for a review) many different 
works adopt the Pavitt taxonomy for classifying sectors according to their main innovation 
characteristics.  
11 Bogliacino and Pianta (2015) have recently extended the Pavitt taxonomy by including also 
the services sectors, while previous taxonomies were manly limited to the manufacturing 
industry. 
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benefit more from network agreements. For such firms, entering a network 
implies an increase in value added per unit of revenues (+ 0.009), an increase 
in export share (+0.007) and an increase in profits measured through ROA 
(+0.01), and in all the cases the impact is higher with respect to the results 
for the whole sample. Similar considerations, but limited to the case of export 
share, are also valid in the case of supplier dominated industries, in which 
networking is found to increase the propensity to export: the coefficient 
(0.008) is larger than the one recorded for the entire sample.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes one of the first empirical analyses on a very large 
scale of firms’ networking activities. We analyze a large and representative 
sample of SMEs, defined as firms employing between 10 and 250 
employees, operating in Italy in the period 2008-2014, for which we collect 
financial statements information. Taking advantage from the recent 
introduction of a specific formal network agreement in Italy, we estimate the 
short run advantage in terms of economic performance from entering this 
specific typology of networks. The Italian formal network is a specific 
contractual agreement “bringing together firms to co-produce, co-market, 
co-purchase or co-operate in product or marked development”12. The main 
advantage is that there is a clear distinction of firms included and not 
included in networks. In order to isolate the effect on performances from 
self-selection of firms and to take into account the impact of unobservable 
characteristics, we rely on a fixed effect estimator that accounts for 
individual and year specificities by demeaning all variables included in our 
econometric models. We adopt different measures of performance: the 
capacity to create value added per unit of revenues, profitability (measured 
by ROA or ROS) and export propensity. We find a general positive and 
significant effect of formal network agreements on value added created and 
on the export shares, but in both cases the effect is small in magnitude. We 
can conclude that a positive effect of formal networking in Italy exists on 
both value added created and export, but it is small, while it is slightly 
negative or better negligible on profits. 
Moreover, we divide our sample between small (less than 50 employees) 
and large SMEs. The results show that value added created mainly increases 
for small SMEs, while the export propensity mainly increases for large 
SMEs. Then, we divide our sample according to the geographical location of 
firms, in order to account for socio-economic differences among Italian 
                                                          
12 This definition of a formal network is very similarly to the one proposed by Huggins (2001). 
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macro-areas. Our results show that the advantage from networking is 
stronger, in terms of both value added created and export propensity, for 
firms located in more underdeveloped areas. Regressions based on 
subsamples of sectors show that the results on value added created and export 
are mainly driven by firms operating in industries classified as specialized 
suppliers and supplier dominated which can be considered as clusters of 
traditional industrial sectors. Our empirical evidence seems to support the 
idea that networks are more beneficial for firms operating in less favorable 
environments or characterized by an intrinsic weakness. In this sense, 
stimulating resources sharing as well as firms’ interactions or information 
exchange through networking can be win-win opportunities for Italian firms. 
On the one hand, networking can represent an alternative to dimensional 
growth in order to reach a critical mass of information and experience. On 
the other hand, networks can represents a valid way to overcome 
infrastructure lacks and isolation problem typical of less developed area 
where high-level services are not always guaranteed.  
The fact that this analysis focused on a specific network agreement is both 
a strength and a weakness of our analysis. In fact, we are able to identify 
clearly the moment and the characteristics of those formal networks, but we 
are unable to identify other kinds of informal cooperation among firms that 
are not formalized throughout the network contract and we cannot isolate 
other formal agreements such as joint ventures or supplying contracts. 
Moreover, even if the estimation techniques sound appropriate for 
eliminating self-selection issues and unobservable characteristics, which are 
both potential source of endogeneity, the interpretation of results in terms of 
direct causality effect between networking and economic performance 
should be taken with care. Observations for the years after entering a network 
agreement are limited by the short period available, and the fact that 
networking overlaps with the recent economic crisis can increase the 
potential uncertainty of obtained results. Probably our outcomes should be 
more consistent and robust in the future when more observation of firms 
entering formal networks will be available. At the present stage of research, 
we are able to catch only short-term effects. 
 
References 
Archibugi D., 2001. Pavitt’s Taxonomy Sixteen Years On: A Review 
Article, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 10: 415 – 425. 
Bentivogli C., Quintiliani, F. and Sabbatini D., 2013. Le reti di imprese, 
Banca d’Italia – QEF, n. 152. 
V - 80 
Birley, S., 1985. The role of networks in the entrepreneurial process. Journal 
of Business Venturing 1, 107–117 
Bodnaruk A., Massa M., Simonov A., 2013. Alliances and corporate 
governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 107: 671-693.  
Bogliacino F. and Pianta M., 2015. The Pavitt taxonomy revisited. Patterns 
of innovation in Manufacturing and Services, WP, Documentos FCE-
CID, Documento Escuela de Economia n. 57.  
Chell, E., Baines, S., 2000. Networking, entrepreneurship and microbusiness 
behavior. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 12, 195–215. 
Colombo E., Mangolini L. and Foresti G. 2014. Il quarto osservatorio 
IntesaSanpaolo-Mediocredito sulle reti d’impresa, Intesa Sanpaolo - 
Servizio Studi e Ricerche. 
Confindustria, 2016. Reti d’impresa. L’identikit di chi si aggrega, Centro 
Studi Confindustria. 
Das T, Teng B-S. 2002. Alliance constellations: a social exchange 
perspective, Academy of Management Review 27: 445–456. 
Fernhaber S. and Li D., 2013. International exposure through network 
relationship: implication for new venture internationalization, Journal of 
Business Venturing, 28: 316 – 334. 
Goerzen A. and Beamish P.W., 2005. The effect of alliance network 
diversity on multinational enterprise performance, Strategic Management 
Journal, 26: 333–354  
Havnes P. and Senneseth K., 2001. A panel study of firms growth among 
SMEs in networks, Small Business Economics, 16: 293 – 302.  
Huggins R., 2001. Inter-firm network policies and firm performance: 
evaluating the impact of initiatives in the United Kingdom, Research 
Policy, 30: 443 – 458.  
Huggins, R., 2000. The success and failure of policy-implanted inter-firm 
network initiatives: motivations, processes and structure. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 12 (2), 11–135 
inter-firm relationships, International Journal of Production Economics, 
144, 256-267.  
Jack, S. L. 2010. Approaches to studying networks: Implications and 
outcomes, Journal of Business Venturing 25 120–137.  
Koka B. and Prescott J. 2008. Designing alliances networks: the influence of 
network position, environmental change and strategy on performance, 
Strategic Management Journal 29: 639 – 661. 
Lechner C., Dowling, M. and Welpe I., 2006. Firm networks and firm 
development: The role of the relational mix, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 21: 514-540.  
V - 81 
Lechner C., Soppe, B. and Dowling M., 2016. Vertical coopetition and the 
sales growth of young and small firms, Journal of Small Business 
Management, 54(1): 67-84. 
Li H., Corral de Zubielqui, G. and O’Connor A., 2015. Entrepreneurial 
networking capacity of cluster firms: a social network perspective on how 
shared resources enhance firm performance, Small Business Economics, 
45:523–541. 
Lin F. and Lin Y., 2016.The effect of network relationship on the 
performance of SMEs, Journal of Business Research, 69, 1780–1784. 
Lu J. and Beamish P., 2001. The internationalization and performance of 
SMEs, Strategic Management Journal, 22: 565 – 586. 
Mazzola E., Perrone, G. and Kamuriwo D., 2016. The interaction between 
inter-firm and interlocking directorate networks on firm's new product 
development outcomes, Journal of Business Research, 69: 672 – 682. 
Nickell S., Nicolitsas D. and Dryden N., 1997. What makes firms perform 
well?, European Economic Review, 41 (3-5): 783-796. 
Oliver, A., Ebers, M., 1998. Networking network studies: an analysis of 
conceptual configurations in the study of inter-organizational 
relationships. Organization Studies 19 (4), 549–583. 
Parida V., Patel, P., Wincent, J., and Kohtamaki M. (2016), Network partner 
diversity, network capabilities and sales growth in small firms, Journal 
of Business Research, 69 (6): 2113–2117. 
Parker, S., 2008. The economics of formal business network. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 23, 627-640. 
Pavitt K., 1984. Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a 
Taxonomy and a Theory, Research Policy, 13: 343-373. 
Ritala P. 2012. Coopetition strategy – When is it successful? Empirical 
evidence on innovation and market performance, British Journal of 
Management, 23: 307-324. 
Robson, P.J.A., Bennett, R.J., 2000. The use and impact of business advice 
by SMEs in Britain: an empirical assessment using logit and ordered logit 
models. Applied Economics 32, 1675–1688. 
Rowley T, Behrens D, Krackhardt D. 2000. Redundant governance 
structures: an analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the 
steel and semiconductor industries. Strategic Management Journal, 
Special Issue 21(3): 369–386. 
Schoonjans B., Van Cauwenberge, P and Bauwhede H., 2013. Formal 
business networking and SME growth, Small Business Economics, 41, 
169–181. 
